This article explores the policies and activities undertaken by Kosovo as it seeks diplomatic recognition under conditions of contested statehood and transitional international order. Existing debates about diplomatic recognitionin particular, how independent sovereign statehood is achievedgenerally rest upon systemic factors, normative institutions, and the preferences of great powers. In contrast, we argue that the experience of Kosovo presents a more complex and less pre-determined process of international recognition, in which the agency of fledgling states, diplomatic skill, timing and even chance may play a far more important role in mobilising international support for recognition than is generally acknowledged. In building this argument we explore Kosovo's path to contested independence and examine the complex process of diplomatic recognition, as well as highlight the hybrid justifications for recognising Kosovo's statehood and independence. Without downplaying the importance of systemic factors, this article contributes to a critical rethinking of norms and processes related to state recognition in international affairs, which has implications for a broad range of cases.
Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 and its subsequent efforts to achieve diplomatic recognition have generated a range of reactions and uncertainties. Some legal scholars claim that Kosovo's independence is supportedor at least not opposedby international law, as an exceptional case (Hannum 2011; Weller 2011) . This view, which also has broad political support, takes into account the remedial case for secession after systematic human rights abuses, the context and constitutional circumstances following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the ad hoc nature of international law on the question of secession (Bolton 2013) . This is challenged by others who refer to the overruling norm of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, the necessity of having consent before permitting separation of territory from the host state, and the dangerous implications for international order that the Kosovo case presents in relation to other secessionist claims (Pavkovic and Radan 2011; Wilde 2011; Hilpold 2012; Ker-Lindsay 2012) . Parallels to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea and elsewhere have fuelled debates about the broader, potentially destabilizing, consequences of Kosovo's quest for independent statehood (Milanovic and Wood 2015) . The Kosovo case has also highlighted broad international divisions on the issue of secession and recognitionin this case and more generallywhich polarize debates and blur the distinction between legal and political analysis. On the one hand, the US and the majority of European states and other allies strongly support Kosovo's statehood and sovereignty, and its campaign for international recognition. On the other hand, Serbiabacked by Russiastrongly opposes Kosovo's independence and proactively works to obstruct the granting of diplomatic recognition to it. China, India, Indonesia and South Africaamongst other important states rising in international influencehave also rejected Kosovo's legal independence. A large number of states, including many located in the global south, can be found in the middle ground, seeking to balance and mantle their positions and often delaying the decision to recognize Kosovo.
Despite these controversies and divisions, Kosovo has managed to secure individual diplomatic recognition from 108 UN member states (as of May 2015), establish diplomatic relations with 70 states, and become a member of numerous international and regional organisations (Interview with Kosovo's former foreign minister 2015). As a barometer of international statehood, therefore, the rate of recognition appears to reflect an upward trajectory, although it is uncertain whether this is towards eventual legal statehood. While Kosovo has not achieved membership of the United Nationsgenerally considered to be a demonstration of universal recognitionit has received a large number of individual recognitions, something that is significant politically and practically in international affairs even in the absence of UN membership and universal recognition.
Patterns of state creation and diplomatic recognition present an intellectual problem for international society. This process problematizes many international norms, it brings norms into conflict, and it does not reflect consistent patterns in historical perspective. Generally, debates about international recognitionand in particular how and why territorial entities achieve international recognition as independent statestend to rest upon systemic factors, and in particular normative institutions and the preferences of great powers (Tir 2002; Tir 2005; Coggins 2014 ). While normative structures and power clearly have explanatory value, the experience of Kosovo suggests a more complex and less pre-determined process of international recognition, in which the agency of fledgling states, diplomatic skill, chance, and timing may play a more important role than is generally acknowledged. Diplomacy makes a difference and the abilities of diplomats from states that seek recognition play an important role in gaining recognition. This suggests that the practice of recognition deserves more attention alongside systemic factors, since the micro-dynamics and politics of recognitionoften reflecting quite mundane pragmatic processesplay an important role in explaining where and why recognition occurs. In broader theoretical context, this points to the importance of the everyday 'power in practice' in understanding international relations (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014) . This article suggests that Kosovo's diplomacy has been crucial in mobilizing international support for diplomatic recognition by exploiting the circumstances of its state creation, by involving powerful states as co-owners and custodians of independence, and by reaching out directly to states that have hesitated to recognize it. Examining the discourse and politics behind the decision of states to recognize Kosovo, this article will illustrate that each act of recognition is a complex calibration of self-interest, normative solidarity, and situational circumstances. It begins by surveying debates relating to patterns of international recognition before presenting an alternative perspective based upon the experience of Kosovo. In conclusion, the article explores the implications of this in broader international perspective.
The missing link in recognition theory
There is extensive research on the politics, legality and ethics of supporting or opposing external self-determination, and on the systemic normative and political conditions which promote or hinder recognition. Early work identified the absence of institutional mechanisms to regulate state recognition or to clearly prescribe when recognition should be extended, which leaves individual states to apply their own judgment, guided by international norms and perceptions of self-interest (Lauterpacht 1944, 385-459) . As a result, the process of international recognition is the subject of long-standing debate among international lawyers, who see recognition as either declarative of statehood or constitutive of statehood. Declaratory theorists hold that 'the political existence of the State is independent of recognition by the other States' as long as the state fulfils certain substantive criteria (James 1991, 353; Talmon 2001) . This implies that states exist ontologically prior to international society and recognition is only a formal acknowledgement of what already objectively exists.
On the other hand, constitutive theorists see recognition itself as a vital component of statehood, and the state is 'viewed as having its genesis in recognition' (Grant 1999, xx) . Brownlie (2008, 206) thus explains how 'the political act of recognition on the part of States is a precondition of the existence of legal rights'. Fabry (2010, 3) suggests that 'at some historical juncture…the society of states came to exist ontologically prior to any new state'. Thereafter, sovereignty was 'rationed and regulated by those who currently enjoy it' (Jackson 2000, 323) , so that newly self-constituted entities wishing to join international society needed to convince existing states that they are suitable candidates for admission. Reconciling these two schools of thought, Lauterpacht (1947) argues that established states have a legal duty to recognize a state when it has met certain requirements. From this perspective, compliance with the normative prescriptions of international society influences which proto-states will be recognized as states and which will not. However, the many norms of international society have different levels of acceptance or 'embeddedness' so that this approach can only partially explain the criteria for the admission of new states to international society.
Political theories of self-determination and secession mainly deal only indirectly
with the question of recognition. On the liberal wing lies the work of Baran (1998, 42) who argues that 'the right of self-determination and wish to secede do not have to justify secession, since they are merely exercising their right of free association'. In recent years a popular argument in political theory is the viability of a remedial right to secession. Buchanan (2007, 351-353) identifies three forms of injustice that give rise to this: 1) large-scale and persistent violations of basic human rights; 2) unjust annexation of a legitimate state's territory and 3) the state's persistent violations of intrastate autonomy agreements. In turn, a key theme has been the 'reality' of the current state system, which is extremely reluctant to recognize the legitimacy of secession and de facto state-like entities, given that international law does not explicitly recognize the right to secession (Holsti 2004) . From a security perspective it is widely believed that secession claims can be destabilizing since they threaten the geostrategic interests of dominant states and can exacerbate intrastate conflict (Naticchia 2005) . For instance, Tir (2002) argues that countries withhold recognition as a way of preventing international conflicts, and instead support internal territorial autonomy and power-sharing. In line with this, territorial federalism and autonomy within existing states is a well-established approach to preventing, managing and settling secession conflicts in divided societies (Weller and Wolff 2005) . The status-quo is generally advocated as a more sustainable measure as opposed to re-negotiating the status with the host state or providing full diplomatic recognition (Lynch 2004) .
The legal and normative theories of recognition provide important criteria for extending or withholding recognition in broad perspective. However, they fall short of explaining the micro-dynamics and processes of recognition in relation to how and why states recognize other (new or fledgling) states. Most of the debates are shifting away from the merits of recognition and are focussing upon the systemic factors that enable recognition under the contemporary global order which contest international law, norms and institutions. For example, Coggins (2014) provides a realist argument on the question of why new states succeed in securing international recognition. Using large-N statistical analysis, Coggins finds that external factors, namely great power politics, have higher explanatory power for how and why recognition occurs than domestic-level explanations or the merits of independence claims. Similarly, Fabry (2010, 8) argues that '[r]ecognition by the great powers has normally preceded, and carried far more weight than, recognition by other states. Indeed, the latter have normally looked to the former for direction; where they did not, their expeditiousness was likely of little import.' Seen from this perspective, although the right of recognition is delegated to individual states, they often follow great powers in their foreign policy conduct due to political and economic dependency, membership of common security regimes, or through sharing the same ideological orientation.
Beyond these different discussions that focus on the normative and political explanations for granting or withholding recognition, there has recently been growing interest in the diplomatic and coercive measures deployed to prevent recognition of new states. Ker-Lindsay (2012) shows that the 'diplomatic counterinsurgency' to prevent recognition entails a variety of tactics, such as boycotting or breaking diplomatic relations with states that recognize break-away territories, appealing to international judiciary bodies, rewarding states which withhold recognition, utilizing public diplomacy and demonizing self-determination, and blocking participation by breakaway entities in international bodies (Ker-Lindsay 2012, 80-108). Caspersen (2012) considers the internal politics of unrecognized states, looking mainly at how they survive under conditions of constrained sovereignty, imperfect statehood, insecurity, and external rejection. Yet Pål Kolstø (2006, 723-40) is more representative of the scholarship in disregarding the diplomatic agency of new states, focusing instead upon the strengths of the breakaway entity, the weakness of the parent state, support from an external patron, and the engagement of the international community.
What this discussion shows is that prevailing claims regarding state recognition largely rest upon the broad theoretical themes of international relationseither normative or political systemic theories. The missing link in understanding what facilitates, influences or obstructs recognition is an account of the micro-politics of the process. Fabry (2012, 7) considers recognition as 'a single act with both legal and political aspects' similar to 'an act of employing military force or an act of imposing economic sanctions or an act of expelling a foreign diplomat'. We diverge from this perspective of recognition-as-act and consider rather recognition-as-process as a more viable explanation of the current politics of recognition, building upon the work of Geldenhuys (2009) and Ker-Lindsey (2012). Considering recognition not an act but a process provides space to disentangle the micro-politics of diplomatic recognition as well as account for the complex entangling of political, economic, normative, and institutional rationales at different stages of the recognition process. The micro-politics of diplomatic recognition encompasses the discourses and practices invoked by fledging states in their pursuit of securing diplomatic recognition, as well as the dialogical dynamics and diplomatic techniques aimed at generating international acceptance and overcoming obstacles from opponents. The experience of Kosovo lies between the declaratory and constitutive theories of recognition; whereby simultaneously the political leadership promotes the existence of the Kosovo state regardless of recognition and works in constituting international legitimacy and joining international society through diplomatic recognition and membership of regional and international organisations. Although Kosovo is not representative of territorial entities seeking independence and international recognitionindeed, it is quite exceptionalit provides an interesting illustration of the political dynamics, processes and challenges that are involved in recognition campaigns.
The road to independence
Kosovo's efforts to gain independence and international recognition must be understood against a history of regional disintegration, instability and repression (Weller 2008b; Bolton 2013 ). The first attempt of Kosovo to achieve independence took place in July 1990 in the context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Although the declaration of independence did not attract international support, except from Albania, this act marked the beginning of an advocacy campaign for internationalizing the Kosovo issue and attracting international attention to human rights abuses in Kosovo (Phillips 2012; Koinova 2013) . The failure of the US and key European states to include Kosovo in the Dayton Peace Accordsbecause of the fear that Serbia would withdraw from the peace process if autonomy for Kosovo was on the table at that pointrepresented a critical turning point in Kosovo's quest for statehood (Holbrooke 1998) . It led to the transformation of peaceful resistance in Kosovo into a military campaign, which secured international attention and helped to establish direct communication between Kosovo's political representatives and external actors (Clark 2000) . At the peak of the Kosovo conflict, as part of the Rambouillet peace talks, Kosovo's political and military representatives agreed to extensive autonomy under Serbia conditional upon the removal of Serb armed forces and a referendum on its political future (Weller 2009 ). However, Serbia rejected this settlement and intensified its offensive on Kosovo, and NATO led a military campaign in 1999 which marked another turning point and opened the prospects for gradual separation from Serbia. The territory was placed under UN administration and this strengthened the political momentum for eventual independence and statehood through consolidating the internal dimensions of sovereignty (King and Mason 2006; Visoka and Bolton 2011; Zaum 2007) . 
Kosovo's recognition tactics
During and after its supervised independence, diplomatic recognition remains a national priority for Kosovo, and certainly the priority for foreign policy (Interview with a Kosovar diplomat 2014). It represents one of the most important aspects for upholding and consolidating, both internally and externally, the sovereignty of Kosovo. The absence of universal recognition is perceived as a threat to Kosovo's political existence, which undermines domestic sovereignty and could affect its territorial integrity (ibid).
Diplomatic recognition has become a crucial challenge for the normal functioning of the country as well as its aspiration to join the Euro-Atlantic community, the UN and other international organisations. However, without overwhelming recognition and the support of the UN Security Council members (notably, Russia and China) Kosovo cannot become a full member of the UN, and this severely limits its political, economic and societal development. Recognition is also essential for the membership of Kosovo in regional organisations and especially for integration into the European Union. A lack of universal recognition also negatively affects foreign investment and the integration of Kosovo's citizens into a range of global networks.
Kosovoas of May 2015has been formally recognized by 108 UN member states. Its statehood is recognized by all its neighbours except Serbia, a majority of European countries, 23 out of 28 member states of the EU, 24 out of 28 NATO member states, all seven member states of the G-7, and a number of countries from all continents.
The principal reasons provided for recognition are that Kosovo's independence has enhanced regional peace and stability, it has upheld minority protection, it has strengthened state capacity, and it has facilitated self-determination as a last resort against a background of injustice and suppression by Serbia (Bolton and Visoka 2010) . Between 
Why states recognize Kosovo
Kosovo's independence and its attempts to gain international recognition have triggered much controversy among academics, diplomats and policy-makers and the merits of this campaign are both political and polarized. Kosovo's case for statehood has often been overshadowed by international law debates on self-determination, the role of great power politics in state formation, and the inevitable alignment of Kosovo with the US and other major western powers (Weller 2008a; Ker-Lindsay 2009; Milanovic and Wood 2015) .
However, to date there are no serious studies which examine the reasons why states have recognized Kosovo. In this section we examine the public justifications provided by states which have recognized Kosovo, and these generally reflect the specific circumstances and context of Kosovo, including its recent history. Clearly, public justifications are not necessarily a true indication of motivations, but the political framing and choice of narrative of states is politically significant. The majority of states that have A large number of states have justified their decision to recognize Kosovo based on its commitment to build a multi-ethnic and democratic state. For example, Austria based its decision on the assumption that the new state of Kosovo will operate 'based on the principles of democracy, rule of law and the respect of human rights, including the rights of ethnic communities. The full commitment to respecting these principles, in particular securing the equal participation of all communities in the political process, is a precondition for being integrated in the circle of democratic-pluralistic states of Europe' (Austrian . The normative framing of the declaratory support for Kosovo's independence is at odds with some criticism of standards of democracy, rule of law, and minority protection in Kosovo, however (Freedom House 2015) . While many countries have based their decision for recognition on such standards this has largely corresponded to Kosovo's expression of commitment rather than the realization of normative conditionality for statehood (see Caspersen 2015) . Interestingly, domestic factors in Kosovoan exception being the dialogue with Serbiahave not appeared to be a major justification of states for delaying the recognition of Kosovo. Perhaps this could be explained by the fact that a majority of states that have not yet recognized Kosovo do not base their diplomatic conduct on normative considerations and conditionality.
Another factor which explains why Kosovo has received broad international recognition concerns the co-ownership of its statebuilding process with the international community under US and European leadership. The declaration of independence and the campaign for recognition were not unilateral acts but in fact closely coordinated with key regional and global actors. Kosovo's leaders have intentionally cultivated this strategic dependency to promote international political support and engagement for its campaign for statehood. The same approach has also been used in pursuing international recognition more widely. So, the 'co-owners' and strong supporters of Kosovo The prevalence of contextual arguments in favour of recognizing Kosovo was supplemented with regional geopolitical considerations. A large number of states that have recognized Kosovo have justified their decision by the expectation that Kosovo independence would bring regional stability, would contribute to international peace and security, and would also normalize inter-state relations in the Balkans (Bolton and Visoka 2010) . Croatia also referred to regional stability when it argued that 'independent Kosovo will be developed as a democratic state of equal citizens in which human rights will be firmly respected, and which will be based on the rule of law. By that, basic preconditions will be created for the Republic of Kosovo to act as an important and responsible factor of peace and stability in the region' (The President of Croatia 2008). Similarly, Montenegro expressed the hope that Kosovo 'will give contributions to development and strengthening of good-neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, and to the (2014) calls the 'smart' diplomatic efforts of Kosovo. It is in this sense that Kosovo's experience illustrates that it is not broad principles alone which determine the outcome of recognition campaigns, but also events and tactics. The micro-politics of recognition involves the pragmatic actions of Kosovo and its international partners in the quest for recognition alongside complex lobbying. In understanding the micro-politics of recognition, it is important to examine recognition as a process and a series of acts, as well as explore the techniques and arguments invoked as a smart power and persuasion approach.
The outcome of Kosovo's campaign for diplomatic recognition rests mainly in the pursuit of recognition by individual states. This strategic approach was the only option left after the UN Security Council did not endorse the UN Secretary General's special envoy's comprehensive settlement for Kosovo, which had suggested a supervised independence for Kosovo. Although in the past groups of states have pushed for collective recognition of new and emerging states (Grant 1999, 170-171; Caplan 2005, 64) , in the case of Kosovo there was insufficient support within the UN, EU or NATO to provide Kosovo with collective recognition. Within each of these organizations there were a number of states that, for various reasons, withheld or delayed their recognition of Kosovo. The most significant example of this was set out first by the European Union just one day after Kosovo declared independence. The EU Council (2008) The evidence suggests that Kosovo has not taken international recognition for granted, and nor does it accept that its status is a pre-determined condition of structural forces and norms. It has tried to cultivate a strategic approach for seeking recognition In response to this, Kosovo decided to orient its recognition strategy in five directions, for which it has developed a new bureaucratic structure, a proactive diplomatic service, and an active diplomatic representation abroad (Government of Kosovo 2011; Interviews with Kosovo diplomats 2014). The first strategic direction includes working with individual states and adjusting its approach to seeking recognition based on their foreign policy and position towards Kosovo independence. The second strategic direction includes working with statesincluding those which have taken an undefined stance or are resistant towards Kosovo's independenceto incrementally constitute the case for formal recognition. The third strategic direction targeted specific states on the assumption that a decision by one state would result in recognition or create pressure for recognition amongst neighbours or members of regional political arrangements. The fourth strategic direction includes working with multilateral mechanisms to establish links with individual states and gain collective recognition from international organisations. The final strategic direction involves working with distinguished former statesmen and women and utilizing public diplomacy for attracting positive visibility and political momentum.
As a part of this strategic thinking Kosovo realized from an early stage that recognition is not a single act, but a complicated process with multiple stages. From this experience it has approached the recognition-as-process across a number of stages and approaches involving direct and indirect contacts with other states as illustrated in Table   1 . At the forefront of the recognition campaign between 2011 and 2014 was Kosovo's minister of foreign affairs, whose lobbying campaign achieved 31 recognitions, establishing diplomatic relations with 38 countries, and making official visits to over 25 countries that had not recognized Kosovo (Interview with Kosovo's former foreign minister 2015). Particular attention has been given to developing contacts with states which have not yet extended recognition but where there is sufficient reason to believe that they are open to persuasion. In this regard, building personal relations, countering the objections and counter-recognition efforts of Russia and Serbia, and understanding the diplomatic code of conduct of the target state have been key tactics (Hoxhaj 2014) .
Serbia and Russia have constantly tried to undermine Kosovo's lobbying efforts through
sending their ambassadors or special envoys before or after Kosovo visits these countries to advise and pressure against taking any affirmative decision (Interview with a Kosovar diplomat 2014). The main arguments used by Serbia and Russia are that Kosovo independence was against international law and it has a destabilizing effect in the Balkans. While these counter-recognition efforts have had an impact, they apparently have slowed down the recognition process rather than reversed it.
Often the decision to recognize Kosovo has been made during a visit to the target state, but there have been many cases when the decision was taken after several months of extensive diplomatic exchanges and lobbying as part of multilateral events (Interview with a Kosovar diplomat 2014). The more the diplomatic communication was intensified at the ministerial and ambassadorial level the higher were the chances for recognition as all these small efforts helped creating a critical momentum (Hoxhaj 2013b ). Kosovo has worked closely with key Euro-Atlantic partners and has utilized its special relationship with these states. Kosovo diplomacy has coordinated closely with the US, UK, Germany,  Send regular requests for establishing diplomatic relations to individual states  Lobby for recognition through powerful states and former Western diplomats and statesman  Utilise bilateral and multilateral forums to arrange informal meetings and seek recognition from targeted states  Seek membership in regional and international organizations to build international legitimacy and increase chances for individual and collective recognition  Arrange special visits to the states that have not yet recognized Kosovo  Build personal relations and direct communication with Ministers of Foreign Affairs and make them 'friends' of Kosovo and lobbyists for Kosovo recognition  Pursue an incremental approach to recognition, and when formal recognition is not possible enter in alternative institutional cooperation arrangements  Use public diplomacy to attract recognition and improve the international image of Kosovo  Imitate and develop an institutional culture of diplomatic rituals and practices similar to other regional and European neighbours  Take a proactive stance towards global and regional issues, which have the potential to reward Kosovo with recognition from particular states  Work proactively and intensively with targeted groups of states and deploy various strategic responses to convince these states to recognize Kosovo. recognized Kosovo. Despite the fact that Serbia has not officially recognized Kosovo and has undertaken an active campaign to obstruct Kosovo's international recognition there are numerous indications in recent years that Serbia has softened its stance on Kosovo's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and statehood. Serbia has agreed to enter negotiations with the most senior Kosovo government representatives indicating recognition of them as legitimate counterparties in the negotiation process (KIPRED 2013). The agreement on Kosovo's regional participation and representation permits Kosovo's membership in regional organizations under the condition that Kosovo is represented with a reference to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999 As part of the second strategic direction for recognition there is the group of states such as Russiathat proactively use their political and economic capabilities to oppose Kosovo statehood and recognition. While Serbia is gradually accepting Kosovo's status as part of the EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of bilateral relations, its foreign policy is also attuned towards preventing Kosovo from joining the international society. Serbia and Russia have anticipated which countries Kosovo would seek recognition from and are pre-emptively seeking to impress upon these states the danger that recognition of Kosovo would bring to bilateral relations, and wider implications for international law and stability. There are also cases of Russian visits taking place after Kosovo's request for recognition as well as protest notes in response to states accepting This differentiated approach has resulted in recognition by a large number of small states across different parts of the world, and thisdespite the opposition of some powerful statesis politically important in the longer term. Even though Kosovo is not a member of the UN and some of the structural constraints upon its statehood are extremely difficult to change, the large number of states that recognize it is itself highly significant since it strengthens its claim to membership of international society and allows it to exploit many of the opportunities this provides. If Kosovo's recognition only extended as far as its key supporters and patrons in North America and Western Europe its international reach would be severely limited, but the large number of recognizing states, including small states, makes a difference, and this is where the Kosovo's efforts to achieve as many individual recognitions as possible are meaningful.
The fourth strategic direction for achieving recognition has been pro-active engagement with multilateral forums and regional organizations. Kosovo has focussed upon major international capitals where most international organizations have their offices and states have diplomatic representation, such as New York, London, Paris, and Brussels, to establish initial contacts to be later followed with individual visits to these countries. The idea of lobbying through multilateral organizations has two basic goals.
The first goal is to achieve membership of Kosovo in these multilateral organizations to expand international legitimacy and reinforce statehood. The second goal is the utilization of the structures and opportunities within these organizations to exert pressure and influence over member states that had not recognized Kosovo. In relation with the European Union, Kosovo has utilized the integration process in this organization for the purpose of further consolidating statehood in this way. Over the years, Kosovo has influenced the European parliament in favour of recognizing Kosovo and passing resolutions to call upon the five EU member states that have not recognized Kosovo to do so (European Parliament 2014). In negotiating the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU, Kosovo negotiated the same content as all other countries in the regionwhich implies sovereign equalityand has persuaded the EU to allow some access to the 'international democracy community' and the European common foreign and security policy (Interview with a Kosovar diplomat 2015). Although Kosovo is not recognized by the EU as a whole and specifically not by five member states, Kosovo has thus managed to get similar treatment as other countries in the region in the integration process. This has increased Kosovo's international credibility and has also contributed to the recognition process more broadly.
Kosovo is pursuing collective recognition through the back door by pursuing future membership of the EU. It has framed its integration process in the EU as an opportunity for many small states around the world to have Kosovo as a European hub for their interests. Kosovo has argued that the membership of the Council of Europe 2013). Kosovo also utilized its civil society, media, and artists to visit countries that have not recognized Kosovo and shape the attitudes of host societies on Kosovo as well as indirectly generate pressure upon the governments of these countries to recognize the territory. The digital diplomacy campaign was also successful in increasing Kosovo's presence in the internet and the appearance of Kosovo as an independent state in the webpages of businesses, universities, and airports. Key Kosovar diplomats are very active in Twitter and Facebook, reaching out to wide audiences. As a part of public diplomacy for recognition, the Kosovar diaspora has also been active in celebrating the anniversary of independence with public events in major European capitals.
Notwithstanding Despite these challenges, Kosovo's quest for diplomatic recognition is a distinct case which illustrates the resilience of new states for navigating through the messy fabric of international society. Despite the opposition of very powerful states Kosovo has secured recognition from a majority of the world's states, and this cannot be explained solely as a function of Kosovo's friends, without reference to Kosovo's diplomacy. As this article has illustrated, accounting for the micro-politics and the interplay of systematic and situational factors provides better grounds for understanding the struggle of contested states to exist in international society.
Conclusion
This article has examined the processes through which Kosovo has secured wide international recognition under conditions of contested statehood and fragmented international support. The article has shown that recognition is not a single political and legal act, but a complex process which needs to be unpacked and critically traced to be able to capture the complex and sometimes haphazard forces and processes that enable or obstruct international recognition. The evidence in this article has suggested that multiple and overlapping factorsnot all of which can be described as systemichave contributed to and facilitated the process of Kosovo's extensive recognition. While the recognition process is embedded into powerful normative arguments for independence and recognition, and facilitated by the co-ownership of the independence process with key global and regional powers, a key locus for a successful campaign for recognition has been the agency of Kosovar diplomats and political representatives in utilizing multiple approaches, resources, and strategies. Kosovo would not have been able to secure 108 individual recognitions within eight years of its independence without the support of powerful patronsnotably the US and major European statesbut Kosovo's own efforts have played a crucial role in generating a momentum and support from great powers and utilizing this extensive international legitimacy to reach out independently and successfully to other countries. Notwithstanding the opposition of some powerful states, Kosovo's persistent diplomacy, and the level to recognition this has helped to achieve, has created a situation of de facto membership of the international society.
The Kosovo struggle for securing diplomatic recognition signifies important patterns and implications for the future of state recognition in international politics. The possibility for global consensus for the formation of new states and for granting universal recognition is narrowing as a result of increasing polarization between existing global powers and the emerging or resurgent ones. Consequently, the recognition of states by one political bloc of states can politicize and complicate the recognition process in broader perspective. Kosovo has received wide recognition by the majority of states belonging to the Euro-Atlantic community, and no recognition from other emerging powers that are positioned behind Russia on the question of Kosovo's independence.
Over the years, it has become clear that recognition of Kosovo was caught between great power rivalries which significantly undermine many aspects of Kosovo's quest for statehood. Although this polarization affects the prospects for recognition, pro-active diplomacy gradually shifts the grounds of these systemic challenges and shapes a new critical mass for international legitimization. The Kosovo case signifies the blurring lines between power politics and normative arguments in pursuing diplomatic recognition, while highlighting the interplay of factors in shaping international responses to state recognition.
Kosovo has invoked a differentiated strategyand different argumentsfor recognition, in line with the interests of states whose support it seeks and regional dynamics. It has built strategic relations and utilized the support of the US and a majority of European partners to reach out to other states and international organizations that have not recognized Kosovo. Hybrid justifications for recognition invoked by statescombining contextual particularism with normative universalismhave provided powerful arguments to facilitate further recognition of Kosovo and a strong base for Kosovo diplomacy to advance the quest for universal recognition. Part of Kosovo's diplomacy has also been the attempt to make non-recognition unattractiveas a disservice to justice and democracyand this approach has played a role in achieving recognition. Furthermore, once Kosovo reached its critical mass of being recognized by over half of the UN member states, the attraction of new recognition became much easier and faster.
The particularities of the Kosovo case require a rethink of the norms and practices that are in constant flux in a rapidly transforming global order. The analysis here demonstrates that the process of international recognition is not only a condition of systemic and power-political forces. The Kosovo experience demonstrates, once again, how decentralized and unregulated the issue of recognition is, as a political process beyond any universal normative consensus and consistency. Seen from the point of view of practice, it is rare to find a country that has a principled or consistent policy on state recognition. The norms of recognition are determined in practice and constantly evolve, making it difficult, if not impossible, to identify generalizations across many different cases. It is for this reason that theoretical generalizations of diplomatic recognition are often misguided in relation to the broad variety of practices.
